Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most promising protocols in quantum information processing. Besides the Bennett-Brassard 84 QKD protocol, the interesting Ekert 91 (E91) protocol makes use of the nonlocality of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs of quantum bits (qubits).

As is well known, even local realistic models can violate the Bell’s inequality if two remote experimenters, Alice and Bob, simply do not take into account non-detection events in their processing of the experimental data. This has been termed the detection-loophole (e.g. and references therein. A discussion on the security of the Bennett-Brassard 84 protocol in connection with non-detection events has recently been given ).

An issue in QKD is whether legitimate users (also Alice and Bob) can trust a QKD system when they do not necessarily trust the manufacturer of the system. Of course, this is not a problem if Alice and Bob use only QKD systems that they have made themselves. However, this is often impractical. If Alice and Bob conclude that the QKD system provided by a manufacturer cannot be trusted, the next problem is to determine how they can test the QKD system as simply as possible. A basic ingredient for security of the E91 protocol is the principle that an eavesdropper (Eve) cannot emulate true entangled pairs of qubits by any local means, or more specifically that Eve cannot violate Bell’s inequality by any separable states. One may think that this principle will hold whatever detectors are used by Alice and Bob, including those provided by the manufacturer, as long as the detectors give a result that violates Bell’s inequality. If this is the case, then the E91 protocol is the principle that an eavesdropper cannot successfully eavesdrop if the QKD system has been appropriately designed by the manufacturer. A loophole utilized here is that of ‘free-choice’ (or ‘real randomness’). Local QKD devices with pseudo-random sequence generator installed in them can apparently violate Bell’s inequality. However, this is not the case if they ignore non-detection events because Eve can make use of the detection-loophole, as Larsson showed. We show that even when legitimate users take into account non-detection events Eve can successfully eavesdrop if the QKD system has been appropriately designed by the manufacturer. A loophole utilized here is that of ‘free-choice’ or ‘real randomness’ (e.g. ). This paper is organized as follows. We introduce the E91 protocol, briefly describe Larsson’s work, introduce the loophole of free-choice and then show how the pseudo-random sequence can be utilized by Eve to violate Bell’s inequality by local means. Finally, we briefly discuss a debate on Bell’s inequality violation and conclude.

In the E91 protocol, first Alice and Bob distribute pairs of qubits in a Bell state \( |\Psi^-\rangle = (1/\sqrt{2})(|0\rangle_A|1\rangle_B - |1\rangle_A|0\rangle_B) \). Here \( n \) is a positive integer, \( |0\rangle \) and \( |1\rangle \) are normalized and orthogonal states, and \( A \) and \( B \) denote Alice and Bob. (The protocol here is a modified version of the original E91 protocol with the essence unchanged.) For each instance \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, n \), each user randomly and independently chooses to perform either normal measurement or checking measurement. Later, the only cases used are those where Alice and Bob’s measurements match, while the other cases are discarded. Among the matched cases, those where both Alice and Bob choose a normal measurement is the normal phase, while the other case is the checking phase. In normal the phase, each user performs \( S_z \) measurements with a set of basis \( \{ |0\rangle, |1\rangle \} \). The outcomes of \( S_z \) measurements are perfectly correlated and thus used as a key later. In the checking phase, each user performs those measurements suitable for Bell’s inequality violation of the state \( |\Psi^-\rangle \): Alice (Bob) randomly and independently chooses one between the two directions \( a \) and \( a' \) \( (b \) and \( b') \) for measurements. Then Alice (Bob) performs spin-measurements in the chosen direction. Spin-measurement in direction \( p \) \( (q) \) is denoted as \( S(p) \) \( (S(q)) \) where \( p = a, a' \) \( (q = b, b') \). The probability that Alice gets a result \( \pm 1 \) in spin-measurement \( S(p) \) and Bob gets a result \( \pm 1 \) in spin-measurement \( S(q) \) is denoted as \( F_{\pm \pm}(p,q) \). The correlation function \( E(p,q) \) is given by \( E(p,q) = P_{++}(p,q) + P_{--}(p,q) - P_{+-}(p,q) - P_{-+}(p,q) \). Bell’s inequality is then given by \( |E(a,b) + E(a,b') + E(a',b) - E(a',b')| < 2 \). Here the four directions, \( a, a', b, \) and \( b' \), are chosen such that Bell’s
inequality is violated for the state $|\Psi^+\rangle$.

The idea of the E91 protocol can be summarized as follows. If Eve provides separable states to Alice and Bob, then Eve can get information on the key. However, in this case the separable states cannot violate Bell’s inequality in the checking phase. Thus Eve is detected. For example, let us assume that Eve provides either $|0\rangle|1\rangle$ or $|1\rangle|0\rangle$ with equal probability after recording which state she sends at each instance. In the normal phase nothing unexpected happens here. In the checking phase, however, the samples cannot violate Bell’s inequality and thus the attack by Eve is detected. On the contrary, if Eve provides the legitimate Bell state then Eve can pass the checking phase. However, in this case Eve has no information on the key generated at Alice’s and Bob’s sites. If Eve provides a partially entangled state, then she will get partial information on the key.

Let us consider Larsson’s point [10]. Classical information can be encoded on the timing of pulses carrying qubits. The manufacturer designs the QKD system such that the system can read out and make use of the classical information thus encoded. Here apparently the system works normally for Alice and Bob. Assume that a hidden variable $\lambda$ is encoded in the classical information part and that the system is programmed such that it violates Bell’s inequality by making use of the detection-loophole. Then Alice and Bob will observe the system violating Bell’s inequality in the checking phase. Thus Eve is not detected.

However, we now describe another interesting case, termed ‘the free-choice loophole’ [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]: The existence of real randomness is a necessary condition to derive Bell’s inequality. First, let us recall the locality condition for Bell’s inequality. Let $S_A(p)$ ($S_B(q)$) be an outcome of spin-measurement in $p$ ($q$) direction at Alice’s (Bob’s) site. Then a potential candidate is

$$S_A(p) = f(p, q, \lambda), \quad S_B(q) = g(p, q, \lambda),$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where $f$ and $g$ are normal functions. In Eq. (1), the possibility that measurement outcomes at one site depend on those at the other site is not excluded. The reason why the model in Eq. (1) is usually excluded is that if two events are space-like separated, then Alice’s device has no way of obtaining information on the choice of Bob’s device on spin-measurement direction $y$ at the instance when the spin-measurement is performed, and vice versa. Therefore, the measurement outcomes of Alice (Bob) do not depend on those of Bob (Alice). That is, Eq. (1) reduces to

$$S_A(p) = f(p, \lambda), \quad S_B(q) = g(q, \lambda),$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

which is the locality condition. However, there is an important tacit assumption in the reduction from Eq. (1) to Eq. (2) [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]: The choice of Bob’s device on spin-measurement direction $q$ is random so that Alice’s device cannot predict which one Bob’s device will choose at a certain instance, and vice versa. Otherwise, even if the two measurement events are space-like separated, Alice’s device can calculate which direction Bob’s device will choose, and vice versa. Thus, effectively, Alice’s (Bob’s) device has information on which direction Bob’s (Alice’s) device chooses at the instance when they are performing the measurement. Hence in this case the reduction is not valid in general.

Let us now see how Eve can utilize the free-choice loophole in the E91 protocol: The manufacturer designs a QKD system such that each device chooses spin-measurement directions according to a pseudo-random sequence that is installed in the device beforehand. Here the pseudo-random sequences in the two devices are independent. The pseudo-random sequence is one that appears to be random but actually is not. For example, the sequence 9869604401089... is apparently random but it is obtained from $\pi^2$. The QKD system is also designed such that one device contains an algorithm for generating the pseudo-random sequence of the other device. Thus, effectively, one device has information about the choices on spin-measurement direction of the other device. Therefore, the locality condition in Eq. (2) can be effectively violated in the QKD system provided by the manufacturer. In this case, users, after careful inspections, will become aware of a problem in the devices and that the measurement choices claimed to be random are not really random, of course. However, it is impractical for many users to perform such a careful inspection, and moreover it is a very difficult task to identify a pseudo-random sequence. In other respects, the design of the devices is in line with that of Larsson’s: In that the hidden variable $\lambda$ is encoded on the timing of the pulses carrying qubits. The devices can read out and make use of the classical information thus encoded. Therefore, Eve can successfully eavesdrop by adopting an effectively non-local hidden variable model that simulates the Bell state $|\Psi^-\rangle$. Note that here we are dealing with an effectively non-local hidden variable model that can simulate any entangled state.

Now, let us briefly discuss a debate on Bell’s inequality violation [12, 14, 15, 16]. It is clear that the above QKD devices that are intrinsically local can show non-local behaviors apparently and effectively. This kinds of ‘local-but-apparently-nonlocal’ models have already been discussed by several authors, e.g. Bell [12] and Kwiat et al. [14]. Recently, Hess and Philipp claimed to present a local model that violates Bell’s inequality [14, 15, 16]. However, their model is in the same as the ‘local-but-apparently-nonlocal’ models. It is a fact that purely local (deterministic) models without any randomness feded outside can violate Bell’s inequality. However, a big problem is whether the applicable scope of the ‘local-but-apparently-nonlocal’ models can be extended to macroscopic beings that can generate randomness, e.g. humans. This rather philosophical question is beyond scope of this paper.

In conclusion, at first glance the E91 protocol can be secure even if Alice and Bob use any QKD system, as
long as the system gives a result that violates Bell’s inequality. However, as shown by Larsson, this is not the case if they ignore non-detection events because Eve can use detection-loophole. We showed that Eve can successfully eavesdrop, even when Alice and Bob take into account non-detection events, if the manufacturer has designed the QKD system appropriately. A loophole utilized here is that of free-choice. We showed how a local QKD devices with a pseudo-random sequence generator installed in them can apparently violate Bell’s inequality. We briefly discussed a debate on Bell’s inequality violation that is involved with a question on randomness.

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[*] Email address: wyhwang@chonnam.ac.kr