The end of encryption

Sigh! Pandora’s box has been opened (once again). Recent documents leaked by whistle-blower Edward Snowden have revealed that the NSA project “Bullrun” is intruding deeply into the confidentiality of our documents and the privacy of our lives.

 

In their continuous effort to kill privacy on the Internet, the US National Security Agency (NSA) and the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) have made significant progress in breaking almost every basic encryption protocol or have developed the means to bypass them. “US and British intelligence agencies have successfully cracked much of the online encryption relied upon by hundreds of millions of people to protect the privacy of their personal data, online transactions and e-mails.” - The Guardian

So what’s left? With “Prism” and “Tempora”, our public communication on the Internet was already filtered and analysed (see our Bulletin article “Prison or “Prism”? Your data in custody”). “Bullrun” takes this to the next level and is said to be capable of analysing our private, encrypted communications. According to the New York Times, “the [NSA] has circumvented or cracked much of the encryption, or digital scrambling, that guards global commerce and banking systems, protects sensitive data like trade secrets and medical records, and automatically secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and phone calls of Americans and others around the world, the documents show”.

The details of “Bullrun” programme are nicely summarised in a blog post by Prof. Matthew Green, a cryptographer and research professor at Johns Hopkins University:

  • Tampering with national standards (NIST is specifically mentioned) to promote weak or otherwise vulnerable cryptography.
  • Influencing standards committees to weaken protocols.
  • Working with hardware and software vendors to weaken encryption and random number generators.
  • Attacking the encryption used by 'the next generation of 4G phones'.
  • Obtaining cleartext access to 'a major internet peer-to-peer voice and text communications system' (Skype?).
  • Identifying and cracking vulnerable encryption keys.
  • Establishing a Human Intelligence division to infiltrate the global telecommunications industry.
  • And worst of all: somehow decrypting SSL connections.


And there is nothing we can do but watch how a new reality unfolds. Cryptography forms the basis for trust online. With these leaks, online trust has been destroyed. Perhaps if only nations do it, it might be OK, as this is intended for our own protection (isn’t it?). However, although the details of “Bullrun” are still sparse, when the technology is leaked (and classified information always has a tendency to go “public” at some point) and attackers learn how the NSA broke or by-passed encryption, then the doors will be wide open for criminals. Online banking, online shopping and passwords would no longer be secure. Identity theft will become much easier. All our good advice about how to protect your data (“Jekyll or Hyde? Better browse securely”) will become obsolete.

Like everyone else, CERN is also affected. As we usually run standard IT technologies, there is little we can do… but a good start would be to phase out weak encryption protocols like DES, begin using 3072-bit (4096-bit!) RSA keys for public key encryption and eventually kill SSH version 1. Also, we should refrain from SSL and move our web pages, web sites and web services to TLS1.2 as there are already known weaknesses in them (see BEAST attack; or CRIME).

In addition, we can finally deploy multi-factor authentication to better protect sensitive computer services like accelerator controls, finance applications or important signature rights on EDH. Technology is ready to be used that requires you to log-in with not only your standard NICE password but also a second “one-time-password”. This could be sent via SMS to your mobile phone – created on a USB-dongle (“Yubikey”) or by the “GoogleAuthenticator” app – or just using a certificate installed on your CERN Access Card.

Of course, you can do more: if you want to take action, check out the Guardian’s 5 tips to stay secure. Meanwhile, we should consider what data is really worth protecting and what can be made public. If less is marked “confidential”, then we have less to worry about. Is “raw” data really worth protecting? Are meeting minutes really confidential? Can’t your photo on your CERN access card just be published online? The new CERN Data Protection Policy (OC11) should be able to give guidelines on that.


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by Computer Security Team